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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Judith Cunningham, Frederick Deimler III, and Carol 
Vanover (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) claim to represent a 
nationwide class of homeowners who were victims of a 
captive reinsurance scheme perpetrated by M&T Bank 
Corporation, M&T Bank, and M&T Mortgage Reinsurance 
Company (collectively, “M&T”).  Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit 
several years after the applicable statute of limitations had 
expired.  After allowing discovery related to the timeliness of 
Plaintiffs’ claims, the District Court granted summary 
judgment for M&T.  As the Court explained, Plaintiffs’ 
claims were untimely and not subject to equitable tolling.  
Because we agree that equitable tolling does not apply to 
these claims, we affirm.   
I. 
 Plaintiffs obtained residential mortgage loans from 
M&T Bank to finance the purchase of their homes.  When a 
borrower seeks a mortgage loan that exceeds 80% of the 
value of the residence, he or she must ordinarily agree to pay 
for insurance to protect the lender from the risk of default.  
Private mortgage insurance thus permits lenders such as 
M&T Bank to extend credit at lower interest rates and to 
borrowers who might otherwise not be able to get a mortgage 
loan.  Each Plaintiff fell into this category and had to buy 
insurance as a condition of his or her mortgage.  Each paid 
premiums to a private mortgage insurer and, in case of 
default, M&T Bank would be the beneficiary of the insurance 
agreement.  As is customary in the industry, M&T Bank 
selected the insurers with whom the plaintiffs would contract.   
 Companies offering private mortgage insurance will 
often contract with others for “reinsurance” of the risk they 
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hold.  Under a reinsurance agreement, the reinsurance 
company assumes a portion of the risk associated with default 
in exchange for a percentage of the mortgage insurance 
premiums paid by the borrower.  Reinsurance thus allows the 
insurer to manage its own risk and offer greater amounts of 
insurance at lower premiums.  Many mortgage lenders 
operate their own “captive” companies that reinsure 
mortgages the lenders originated.  In this case, M&T Bank 
referred Plaintiffs to private mortgage insurers who, in turn, 
reinsured the insurance policy with M&T Mortgage 
Reinsurance Company—M&T Bank’s captive reinsurer.   
 Beginning in late 2011, counsel sent letters to 
Plaintiffs advising that they were investigating claims 
concerning M&T Bank’s captive mortgage reinsurance.  
Plaintiffs agreed to be part of a lawsuit against M&T and filed 
a putative class action complaint alleging violations of the 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. 
§ 2607, and unjust enrichment.1   
 In the complaint, Plaintiffs claimed to represent a 
nationwide class of persons who obtained residential 
mortgage loans from M&T Bank that were reinsured by M&T 
Mortgage Reinsurance Company.  They alleged that M&T 
Bank and its reinsurer colluded with private mortgage 
insurers, referring customers to the private mortgage insurers 
and receiving in return reinsurance agreements that required 
M&T Mortgage Reinsurance to take on little or no actual risk.  
                                              
1 Plaintiffs also named Mortgage Guaranty Insurance 
Corporation and Genworth Mortgage Insurance Corporation 
as defendants.  After the District Court granted summary 
judgment for all defendants, Mortgage Guaranty and 
Genworth settled with Plaintiffs and they are not participating 
in this appeal.    
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This scheme allegedly violated RESPA’s anti-kickback and 
anti-fee-splitting provisions.  See 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a)–(b).  
 M&T moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that RESPA’s one-year statute of 
limitations barred the claims of Plaintiffs and they were not 
entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period.  The 
District Court denied the motion, declining to resolve the 
fact-bound issue of equitable tolling until the parties could 
take discovery limited to that issue.  Cunningham v. M&T 
Bank Corp., No. 12-cv-1238, 2013 WL 5876337, at *7 (M.D. 
Pa. Oct. 30, 2013); see also In re Cmty. Bank of N. Virginia, 
622 F.3d 275, 301–02 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Community Bank I”) 
(noting that the issue of equitable tolling is “not generally 
amenable to resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion”).   
 After discovery, M&T moved for summary judgment 
and the Court granted the motion.  With the benefit of a more 
detailed factual record, it held that the claims were indeed 
time barred and that Plaintiffs could not equitably toll the 
limitations period.  Cunningham v. M&T Bank Corp., No. 12-
cv-1238, 2015 WL 539761, at *6–8 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2015).  
This was so because none of them had exercised reasonable 
diligence in investigating any potential claims under RESPA.  
Plaintiffs appeal that decision.2   
                                              
2 Plaintiffs’ counsel also filed nearly a dozen identical 
lawsuits in this Circuit against mortgage lenders, private 
mortgage insurance companies, and mortgage reinsurance 
companies.  Three cases (including this one) have proceeded 
to summary judgment, and in each the District Court has 
entered summary judgment for the defendants and concluded 
that the claims under RESPA were time barred and not 




 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction per 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is 
plenary.  Seamans v. Temple Univ., 744 F.3d 853, 859 (3d 
Cir. 2014).  A moving party is entitled to summary judgment 
only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” 
only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), as to whom all 
reasonable inferences must be drawn, Prowel v. Wise Bus. 
Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
                                                                                                     
at *6–8; Hill v. Flagstar Bank, No. 12-cv-2770, 2014 WL 
2892397, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2014); Riddle v. Bank of 
Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-1740, 2013 WL 6061363, at *9 (E.D. 
Pa. Nov. 18, 2013).  Last year, we affirmed the grant of 
summary judgment in one of those three cases in a non-
precedential opinion.  Riddle v. Bank of America Corp., 558 
Fed. App’x 127, 130 (3d Cir. 2014).  Finally, eight cases with 
substantially identical claims remain pending and have been 
stayed awaiting our decision in this appeal.  Ba v. HSBC USA, 
Inc., No. 13-cv-0072 (E.D. Pa.); Barlee v. First Horizon Nat’l 
Corp., No. 12-cv-3045 (E.D. Pa.); Blake v. JPMorgan Chase 
Bank, N.A., No. 13-cv-6433 (E.D. Pa.); Hall v. Wachovia 
Bank, N.A., No. 13-cv-5994 (E.D. Pa.); Manners v. Fifth 
Third Bank, No. 12-cv-0442 (W.D. Pa.); Menichino v. 
Citibank, N.A., No. 12-cv-0058 (W.D. Pa.); Thurmond v. 
SunTrust Bank, No. 11-cv-1352 (E.D. Pa.); White v. PNC Fin. 




 Plaintiffs’ claims under RESPA have a one-year 
statute of limitations.  12 U.S.C. § 2614.  It runs “from the 
date of the occurrence of the violation,” id., which begins at 
the closing of the loan, Community Bank I, 622 F.3d at 281.  
Cunningham, Deimler, and Vanover closed on their home 
mortgage loans in May 2007, June 2008, and October 2007, 
respectively.  They filed suit in June 2012, several years after 
the statute of limitations had expired.   
 Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that their RESPA claims 
are not time barred because they have satisfied the 
requirements to equitably toll the statute of limitations.  
Equitable tolling “can rescue a claim otherwise barred as 
untimely by a statute of limitations when a plaintiff has been 
prevented from filing in a timely manner due to sufficiently 
inequitable circumstances.”  Santos ex rel. Beato v. United 
States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009).  We have previously 
held that the statute of limitations in RESPA is not 
jurisdictional and is thus eligible for equitable-tolling 
consideration.  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Virginia Mortgage 
Lending Practices Litig., 795 F.3d 380, 400 n.20 (3d Cir. 
2015) (“Community Bank II”).  But “[e]quitable tolling is an 
extraordinary remedy which should be extended only 
sparingly.”  Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 751 (3d 
Cir. 2005); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 396 
(2007) (“Equitable tolling is a rare remedy to be applied in 
unusual circumstances, not a cure-all for an entirely common 
state of affairs.”).   
 Plaintiffs’ basis for tolling, also known as fraudulent 
concealment, requires them to show three elements: “(1) that 
the defendant actively misled the plaintiff; (2) which 
prevented the plaintiff from recognizing the validity of her 
claim within the limitations period; and (3) where the 
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plaintiff’s ignorance is not attributable to her lack of 
reasonable due diligence in attempting to uncover the relevant 
facts.”  Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d 494, 509 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  “To demonstrate reasonable diligence [which 
means here, as noted below, to investigate possible claims], a 
plaintiff must ‘establish[] that he pursued the cause of his 
injury with those qualities of attention, knowledge, 
intelligence and judgment which society requires of its 
members for the protection of their own interests and the 
interests of others.’”  Mest v. Cabot Corp, 449 F.3d 502, 511 
(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Cochran v. GAF Corp., 666 A.2d 
245, 250 (Pa. 1995)).   
 Plaintiffs argue that M&T Bank actively misled them 
regarding the nature and existence of their claims.  But before 
Plaintiffs closed on their respective loans as mortgagors, each 
person received a disclosure form separate from the mortgage 
explaining reinsurance in plain language, stating that 
reinsurance could be with a company affiliated with the 
lender, that the reinsurance company would receive a 
percentage of the mortgage, and that the mortgagor had the 
opportunity to opt out of captive reinsurance.  It read:   
Your lender or a subsequent holder of your loan 
(the “Lender”) may[,] directly or through an 
affiliated company (a “Reinsurance Company”), 
enter into a reinsurance agreement with the 
primary insurance company that will be 
providing the mortgage insurance covering your 
loan.  
Under a reinsurance agreement, the Reinsurance 
Company may assume a portion of the risk 
associated with such Mortgage Insurance.  In 
exchange for its assumption of such risk, the 
Reinsurance Company receives a percentage of 
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the mortgage insurance premium paid to obtain 
the mortgage insurance covering your loan.  
The reinsurance agreement does not increase 
the amount you have to pay for mortgage 
insurance or the length of time you must 
maintain the insurance. 
If you do not want the mortgage insurance on 
your loan to be reinsured with Lender’s 
Reinsurance Company you may check the “opt 
out” box below when you sign and 
acknowledge receipt of this disclosure.  Your 
election to opt in or out will not affect our credit 
decision regarding your loan. 
Each Plaintiff signed and dated the disclosure and none 
elected to opt out from reinsurance with an affiliate of M&T 
Bank.  The mortgage documents also disclosed the possibility 
of captive reinsurance on a page of the mortgage each person 
initialed.  Plaintiffs confirmed during depositions that they 
were aware at the time of closing of the possibility of captive 
reinsurance, though none recalled asking any questions about 
the reinsurance agreement.   
 After the closing, Plaintiffs took no steps to investigate 
whether M&T Bank’s captive reinsurance program might 
violate state or federal law.  They did not, for example, ask 
their mortgage insurer if their particular insurance policy had 
been reinsured and, if so, with whom.  They did not seek the 
advice of an attorney, research captive reinsurance, request 
documents related to their mortgage insurance, or take any 
steps to discover if they had a claim under RESPA.3   
                                              
3 If Plaintiffs had taken some steps to investigate captive 
reinsurance, they would have found breadcrumbs leading 
them toward a potential RESPA claim.  Captive reinsurance 
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Plaintiffs claim simply that it was not until late 2011 or early 
2012, when counsel asked them to join a lawsuit, that they 
became aware of the basis for a possible claim under RESPA.   
 On these undisputed facts, we conclude that Plaintiffs 
have failed to show due diligence and cannot use equitable 
tolling to rescue otherwise time-barred claims.  At the 
closing, Plaintiffs were made aware that the mortgage 
insurance on their home might be reinsured with an affiliate 
of M&T Bank and, at that moment, they had all the facts 
necessary to develop their claims under RESPA.  Yet they 
failed to take any steps to investigate during the 
approximately four-year period between the time of the 
closing and the time that they were approached by counsel.  
This inaction was not reasonable diligence.   
 Plaintiffs advance several arguments against summary 
judgment, but none persuade us that the District Court got it 
wrong.  They first argue that they were, in fact, diligent.  
According to their theory of diligence, M&T Bank’s 
misrepresentations in the lengthy mortgage documents did not 
give them any reason to investigate.  And in the absence of 
any “storm warnings” that would put them on notice of the 
                                                                                                     
arrangements date back to the late 1990s.  Lawsuits 
challenging the arrangements as vehicles for illegal kickbacks 
soon followed.  See, e.g., Baynham v. PMI Mortg. Ins. Co., 
No. 99-cv-241 (S.D. Ga. filed Dec. 17, 1999).  And around 
the time Plaintiffs closed on their mortgage loans with M&T 
Bank, their current counsel had brought several nearly 
identical lawsuits against lenders and captive reinsurance 
companies in this area.  See, e.g., Alston v. Countrywide Fin. 
Corp., 585 F.3d 753 (3d Cir. 2009) (complaint filed in August 




need for follow up, Plaintiffs assert that we can excuse their 
inaction until they were put on notice by a letter from a 
lawyer.  We disagree.   
 For one, most of the cases that Plaintiffs cite in support 
of this argument actually address the discovery rule, which 
relates to claim accrual (when the limitations period begins to 
run) rather than equitable tolling (the events that can stop the 
clock on a limitations period once it has begun to run).  Under 
the discovery rule, a cause of action does not accrue until the 
plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the basis for her claim against the 
defendant.  See DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 492 
F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2007); Benak ex rel. All. Premier 
Growth Fund v. All. Capital Mgmt. L.P., 435 F.3d 396, 400 
(3d Cir. 2006); In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 
1325 (3d Cir. 2002).  In deciding when a diligent plaintiff 
would have discovered the basis of a claim, courts look for 
“storm warnings” that would put the plaintiff on notice of her 
injury.  However, the discovery rule is not apt for RESPA 
claims because Congress specifically provided that the 
limitations period begins to run on “the date of the occurrence 
of the violation.”  12 U.S.C. § 2614; see also Macauley v. 
Estate of Nicholas, 7 F. Supp. 3d 468, 487 n.16 (E.D. Pa. 
2014) (“[C]ourts across the country have refused to apply the 
discovery rule to RESPA claims.”).  It is thus irrelevant for 
purposes of the statute of limitations in RESPA when a 
reasonable plaintiff would have discovered her claim.  
 Setting aside that distinction, however, what Plaintiffs 
ask us to do is to ignore the plain words of M&T Bank’s 
disclosure.  Based on the disclosure, they were on notice that 
reinsurance for their mortgage loans was reasonably likely 
through an affiliate of M&T Bank.  Armed with the facts 
necessary to allege their claim under RESPA, it is undisputed 
that they took no steps to investigate whether the reinsurance 
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arrangement was fully valid.  See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, 
Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1390 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“Equitable tolling . . . keys on a plaintiff’s cognizance, or 
imputed cognizance, of the facts supporting the plaintiff’s 
cause of action.”).  Even if M&T Bank’s disclosure did not 
give Plaintiffs warning of the need to investigate, the onus is 
still on Plaintiffs in these circumstances to exercise some 
degree of diligence in order to receive the benefit of equitable 
tolling. 
 Plaintiffs’ reliance on our decision in Community Bank 
II is also misplaced.  There, a class action brought on behalf 
of homeowners alleged that a residential mortgage loan 
business and two banks were involved in a predatory lending 
scheme in violation of RESPA.  795 F.3d at 385.  Though 
some of the homeowners’ claims were barred by RESPA’s 
statute of limitations, class counsel argued that fraudulent 
concealment would toll the limitations period.  On a motion 
to certify a class, defendants argued the issue of equitable 
tolling would be too individualized and too central to the 
litigation for certification under Rule 23(b)(3).  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (class action may be maintained if, among 
other things, “the court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members”).   
 We rejected the argument, holding that commonality 
was satisfied despite the need for some class members to rely 
on fraudulent concealment.  Regarding the due diligence 
element of fraudulent concealment, we noted that “when a 
wrongful scheme is perpetrated through the use of common 
documentation, such as the documents employed to 
memorialize each putative class member’s mortgage loan, full 
participation in the loan process is alone sufficient to establish 
the due diligence element.”  Community Bank II, 795 F.3d at 
404.  Plaintiffs focus on this language to argue that their 
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participation in the loan closing was sufficient to establish 
diligence.  The decision made clear, however, that its 
discussion of fraudulent concealment was limited to the 
commonality question under Rule 23.  It explicitly did not 
“not address whether the class members are actually entitled 
to equitable tolling on the merits,” id. at 404–5; thus it does 
not control our analysis of the very fact-specific doctrine of 
fraudulent concealment in this case.   
 Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the District Court could 
not have properly resolved the question of equitable tolling by 
considering the lack of diligence without also considering 
M&T Bank’s misrepresentations.  In effect, Plaintiffs argue 
that courts must analyze all the elements of fraudulent 
concealment before dismissing a time-barred claim.  This is 
incorrect.  To repeat, there are three elements for fraudulent 
concealment: “(1) that the defendant actively misled the 
plaintiff; (2) which prevented the plaintiff from recognizing 
the validity of her claim within the limitations period; and (3) 
where the plaintiff’s ignorance is not attributable to her lack 
of reasonable due diligence in attempting to uncover the 
relevant facts.”  Cetel, 460 F.3d at 509.  If a plaintiff with an 
otherwise time-barred claim has not presented sufficient 
evidence of even one of the three elements, summary 
judgment may be entered for the defendant.4   
                                              
4 The District Court also entered summary judgment against 
the Plaintiffs on their unjust enrichment claims.  On appeal, 
they make no serious effort to challenge that decision.  They 
simply allege that the District Court erred in dismissing the 
unjust enrichment claims for the same reasons it erred in 
dismissing the RESPA claims.  They provide no authority for 
this argument and, in these circumstances, have waived it for 
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* * * * * 
 Statutes of limitations are “designed to promote justice 
by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that 
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, 
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”  
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 
342, 348–49 (1944).  We will sometimes make an exception 
to the rule where its rigid application would be unfair because 
a defendant concealed its wrong and prevented a diligent 
plaintiff from bringing her claim within the limitations period.  
This not such a case.  Indeed, accepting Plaintiffs’ theory in 
this case—toll indefinitely the limitations period for claims 
under RESPA until a lawyer can find the right plaintiff to join 
a lawsuit and notify other putative plaintiffs—would 
effectively write the statute of limitations out of RESPA.  We 
thus affirm the decision of the District Court granting 
summary judgment for M&T.            
                                                                                                     
purposes of appeal.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 
(3d Cir. 1993).   
